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CRIMINALIZING THE TRANSMISSION OF HIV: CONSENT, 
DISCLOSURE, AND ONLINE DATING 
 
Alexandra McCallum* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Ever since Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) was first recognized as a 
widespread public health problem, policymakers and legal scholars have 
considered how criminal law should be used to influence the sexual behavior of 
people with HIV.1 Surely, HIV is a problem that affects the general health, safety, 
and welfare of citizens. Thus, as most cases of HIV are transmitted through sexual 
conduct,2 states can regulate this conduct pursuant to their police powers.3 
Generally, states that criminalize the transmission of HIV through sexual conduct 
provide an exception for HIV-positive individuals who disclose their status4 and 
obtain consent5 from their partners. However, these statutes tend to be drafted 
broadly and contain ambiguous disclosure and consent language. 
The ambiguities surrounding the consent and disclosure exceptions pose novel 
problems for HIV-positive online daters. Internet dating sites provide a unique 
medium for an individual to contextually communicate his or her serostatus.6 This 
raises a question: Within the meaning of the transmission statutes, does 
* © 2014 Alexandra McCallum, J.D. 2014, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College 
of Law. I would like to thank the Utah Law Review staff for all their hard work and input.  
1 Sarah J. Newman, Prevention, Not Prejudice: The Role of Federal Guidelines in 
HIV-Criminalization Reform, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1403, 1408 (2013) (“The criminalization 
of HIV exposure has . . . received considerable treatment in legal scholarship.”). 
2 Zita Lazzarini et al., Evaluating the Impact of Criminal Laws on HIV Risk Behavior, 
30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 239, 239 (2002). 
3 See id. at 241. 
4 E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.11(B)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013) (“No person, 
with knowledge that the person has tested positive as a carrier of a virus that causes 
[AIDS], shall knowingly . . . [e]ngage in sexual conduct with another person without 
disclosing that knowledge to the other person prior to engaging in the sexual conduct.”). 
5 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.24(2) (West 2007) (“It is unlawful for any person who 
has human immunodeficiency virus infection, when such person knows he or she is 
infected with this disease and when such person has been informed that he or she may 
communicate this disease to another person through sexual intercourse, to have sexual 
intercourse with any other person, unless such other person has been informed of the 
presence of the sexually transmissible disease and has consented to the sexual 
intercourse.”). 
6 Serostatus is defined as follows: “The state of either having or not having detectable 
antibodies against a specific antigen, as measured by a blood test (serologic test). For 
example, HIV seropositive means that a person has detectable antibodies to HIV; 
seronegative means that a person does not have detectable HIV antibodies.” Education 
Materials, AIDSINFO, http://www.aidsinfo.nih.gov/education-materials/glossary/search/sero 
status (last updated Mar. 12, 2014). 
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communicating serostatus nonverbally constitute disclosure? Can an HIV-positive 
individual assume he or she obtained partner consent by displaying serostatus on 
an online profile? Relatedly, can the nature of the dating site itself—for example, a 
site for HIV-positive individuals—serve as disclosure and create a presumption of 
consent? Unfortunately, these answers are unknown. The behavioral complexities 
inherent in negotiating disclosure and consent,7 coupled with assumptions about 
Internet dating community norms, increase the likelihood that good-faith mistakes 
will occur. However, the current state statutory scheme does not punish according 
to a defendant’s degree of culpability.8 
Part II of this Note briefly tracks the history of criminal statutes specific to 
HIV transmission. It also surveys the statutes that criminalize sexual transmission 
of HIV but provide exceptions for consent and disclosure. Lastly, Part II surveys 
the world of online dating and the reasons why e-dating may be particularly 
attractive to those living with HIV. Part III looks at the inherent flaws in state 
disclosure and consent provisions and raises substantive-due-process concerns 
relative to these flaws. Next, the analysis section provides four scenarios—the first 
three demonstrate how assumptions about online community norms increase the 
opportunity for good-faith mistakes, and the fourth presents a scenario where 
substantive-due-process rights may be implicated. Lastly, this Note presents a 
model statute and jury instruction that aim to address these problems.  
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
 
This Part briefly surveys the United States’s legal response to the HIV 
epidemic. Next, it looks at the statutes that criminalize sexual transmission of HIV 
but provide specific exceptions for consent and disclosure. Lastly, this Part 
explores the world of online dating and the reasons why e-dating may attract those 
living with HIV. 
 
A.  The Legal Response to HIV 
 
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is caused by HIV, a virus 
that is transmitted through sexual fluids, blood, and breast milk.9 The virus was 
first discovered among homosexual males in California and New York in 1981.10 
As reported cases of HIV escalated and researchers gained a better scientific 
7 Scott Burris et al., Do Criminal Laws Influence HIV Risk Behavior? An Empirical 
Trial, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 467, 469 (2007) (describing sex as a complex behavior where 
“[HIV] disclosure and safe sex are negotiated non-verbally and contextually”). 
8 Margo Kaplan, Rethinking HIV-Exposure Crimes, 87 IND. L.J. 1517, 1532–33 
(2012). 
9 Can You Get HIV From . . . ?, AVERT, http://www.avert.org/can-you-get-hiv.htm 
(last visited Mar. 19, 2014). 
10 Origins of HIV & AIDS, AVERT, http://www.avert.org/origin-hiv-aids.htm (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2014); History of AIDS Up to 1986, AVERT, http://www.avert.org/history-a 
ids-1986.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2014). 
                                                     
2014] CRIMINALIZING THE TRANSMISSION OF HIV 679 
understanding of the virus, policymakers took initiatives to address the growing 
epidemic. In September 1987, President Reagan created the Presidential 
Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic to advise the White 
House on the public health dangers resulting from the spread of HIV/AIDS.11 One 
year later, the commission released a report on its findings and encouraged states 
to examine the possible need for criminal statutes specific to HIV transmission.12 
Further, by conditioning federal funding for HIV/AIDS prevention programs on 
the ability of state criminal laws to effectively prosecute the knowing transfer of 
HIV, the 1990 Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act 
imposed further pressure on states to criminalize the transmission of HIV.13 By 
1993 nearly half of the states had criminal statutes that targeted HIV transmission 
in some way.14 
 
B.  HIV-Specific Transmission Statutes That Target Consensual Sexual Conduct 
and Provide Disclosure and Consent Exceptions 
 
Presently, twenty-four states have criminal statutes that target HIV-infected 
individuals who—while aware of their HIV-positive status—knowingly engage in 
consensual sexual relations.15 These statutes differ in construction with respect to 
how disclosure of one’s HIV-positive status and partner consent are addressed. 
Fourteen states include nondisclosure and/or lack of consent as an element of the 
crime and, thus, require the prosecutor to prove these elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt.16 Eight states afford the charged individual the opportunity to 
11 James B. McArthur, As the Tide Turns: The Changing HIV/AIDS Epidemic and the 
Criminalization of HIV Exposure, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 707, 713 (2009). 
12 Id. at 713–15. 
13 Id. at 715 (“[S]tates [must] prove the adequacy of their laws for criminal 
prosecution of intentional transmission of HIV before they could receive federal funding 
for HIV/AIDS prevention.”). 
14 Id. 
15 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (2006); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§§ 120290–91 (West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.24(2) (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-5-60(c) (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-608 (2011); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-
16.2 (West 2002); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-41-7-1 (LexisNexis 2011), 35-42-1-9 
(LexisNexis 2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709C.1 (West 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 14:43.5 (2007); MD. CODE. ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 18-601.1 (LexisNexis 2009); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS SERV. § 333.5210 (LexisNexis 2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-27-14(1) (Supp. 
2013); MO. ANN. STAT. § 191.677 (West 2011); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.205 
(LexisNexis 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-5(b) (West Supp. 2013); 10A N.C. ADMIN. 
CODE 41A.0202 (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-17 (2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2903.11(B) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1192.1 (West 2002); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-145 (2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-18-31 (2006); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 39-13-109 (Supp. 2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.4:1 (2009); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 9A.36.011 (West 2009); see also Kaplan, supra note 8, at 1518 n.2. 
16 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123(b) (2006); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 120291 (West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.24(2) (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN § 16-5-
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bring forth evidence of disclosure and consent as an affirmative defense.17 In these 
states, the prosecutor must prove only that the infected person knew he or she was 
infected with HIV and intentionally engaged in sexual relations with another. The 
burden is then placed on the defendant to prove the elements set forth in the 
statute’s affirmative defense provision. These elements vary among the states, but 
most require the defendant to prove the exposed partner knew the defendant was 
infected with the HIV, knew the conduct could result in exposure to the HIV, and 
consented to engage in the conduct with that knowledge.18 Two states’ criminal 
statutes do not mention consent or disclosure and may leave HIV-positive persons 
criminally liable for fully consensual acts.19 The possibility that a nonculpable 
individual will face criminal liability under an HIV-transmission statute is 
particularly threatening for HIV-positive persons who participate in online dating. 
 
C.  Online Dating—Bringing People Together 
 
Each year, millions of people log on to Internet dating sites looking for love 
or sex.20 The percentage of households with access to the Internet is projected to 
rise, which will continue to expand the consumer market for online dating 
services.21 These sites allow members to customize “profiles by answering 
questionnaires, as well as posting pictures, videos, and additional com-
60(c) (2011); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-41-7-1 (LexisNexis 2011), 35-42-1-9 (LexisNexis 
2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.5 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 333.5210 
(LexisNexis 2005); MO. ANN. STAT. § 191.677 (West 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-5(b) 
(West Supp. 2013); 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 41A.0202 (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2903.11(B) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1192.1 (West 2002); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-145 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.4:1 (2009). 
17 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-608(3) (2011); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-16.2(d) 
(West 2002); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709C.1(5) (West 2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-27-14(1) 
(Supp. 2013); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN § 201.205(2) (LexisNexis 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 12.1-20-17(3) (2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-18-33 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
13-109(c) (Supp. 2013).  
18 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-16.2(d) (West 2002); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 709C.1(5) (West 2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN § 201.205(2) (LexisNexis 2012); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 22-18-33 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-109(c) (2010). The model 
statute offered in section III.C shifts the burden to the government to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was culpable with respect to his partner’s consent. This 
structure appropriately shifts the burden onto the prosecution to prove every material 
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
19 MD. CODE. ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 18-601.1 (LexisNexis 2009); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 9A.36.011 (West 2009). 
20 See Eli J. Finkel et al., Online Dating: A Critical Analysis From the Perspective of 
Psychological Science, 13 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 3, 4 (2012).  
21 Dating Services in the US Industry Market Research Report Now Available from 
IBISWorld, PRWEB, (Sept. 9, 2012), http://www.prweb.com/releases/2012/9/prweb9882157 
.htm.  
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ments . . . .”22 While online dating sites enable people to connect beyond 
traditional geographical and sociological constraints, there is often an 
accompanying deficit of information as well.23 
From MillionaireMatch.com to SeniorPeopleMeet.com, niche-dating sites are 
expected to see the greatest growth in coming years.24 Among them are sites 
targeting people with sexually transmitted diseases.25 These sites cater to infected 
individuals who specifically want to date other infected individuals.26 For various 
reasons, people with HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases often prefer these 
sites. One woman described the dilemmas she encountered when revealing her 
sexually transmitted disease to prospective mates: “It’s confusing, because you 
don’t know when the right time is to tell somebody. Should you be up front and get 
it over with or wait until the person develops feelings for you? It’s a big ethical 
problem.”27 She also explained that when she did reveal this information, the man 
she was dating would often break it off.28  
While some individuals, like the woman above, use niche-dating sites as a 
way to be upfront about identity, others do just the opposite. As one scholar notes: 
 
The online environment permits us to foster a feeling of intimacy, 
sharing, and connection without the real-time barriers and filters of 
judgments based on physical appearance, race, occupation, class, and 
age. This freedom is potentially liberating in that we can transcend social 
expectations, identity, and typical scripts for our gender, class, and roles, 
and experiment with alternate models of relating.29 
 
For these people, Internet dating provides an identity apart from that of an HIV-
positive person. Other HIV-positive individuals prefer to reveal or reference their 
serostatus via online dating profiles to avoid the discomfort involved with 
communicating this information to partners face-to-face.30 
22 Trenton E. Gray, Internet Dating Websites: A Refuge for Internet Fraud, 12 FLA. 
COASTAL L. REV. 389, 392 (2011). 
23 Mary D. Fan, Sex, Privacy, and Public Health in a Casual Encounters Culture, 45 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 531, 543, 553 (2011). 
24 PRWEB, supra note 21. 
25 See, e.g., POSITIVESINGLES, http://www.positivesingles.com (last visited Mar. 19, 
2014) (serving individuals infected with herpes, HPV, HIV and other STDs). 
26 Id. 
27 Elizabeth Cohen, Rising STD Rate Sparks Online Dating Sites, CNN (Mar. 12, 
2007, 1:36 PM), http://articles.cnn.com/2007-02-27/health/std.internet_1_herpes-web-sites 
human-papillomavirus?_s=PM:HEALTH.  
28 Id. 
29 Fan, supra note 23, at 543. 
30 One HIV-positive interviewee in a British study on homosexual men and Internet 
dating described, “I still just find it very embarrassing . . . . It’s one of those things. It’s not 
great leading to sex.” Mark Davis et al., E-dating, Identity and HIV Prevention: Theorising 
Sexualities, Risk and Network Society, 28 SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 457, 470 (2006). 
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Internet dating sites not only serve as a meeting ground for relationship-
seekers, but also a platform where individuals pursue casual sex. The capacity of 
the Internet to serve as a meeting ground for sexual encounters is so great that 
some psychologists describe it as the “new sexual revolution.”31  
Adult dating sites facilitate casual sexual encounters among subscribers.32 
Like the more traditional online dating sites, there is a wide range of niche adult 
dating sites that serve the HIV-positive population.33 As these sites continue to 
grow in popularity, people increasingly pursue casual sex with partners met 
online.34 Without traditional contextual sources to inform decision making, adult e-
daters must rely primarily on other users’ online profiles, which may or may not 
contain accurate information.35 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
 
HIV-transmission statutes targeting consensual sexual behaviors fail to draw a 
clear line between sex with disclosure and/or consent and sex without disclosure 
and/or consent. As a result of these ambiguities, situations may arise where the law 
extends into the bedroom, criminalizing consensual, private sexual activity. These 
issues are discussed in turn. 
 
A.  Disclosure and Consent 
 
In the context of sexual relations, the law of disclosure and consent is far from 
clear. The difficulties in ascertaining disclosure and consent arise from the 
nonverbal ways people “negotiate[]” sex.36 Direction as to what constitutes legally 
acceptable disclosure and consent has not been provided by statute or 
jurisprudence.37 Is verbal disclosure and consent mandated? May disclosure and 
31 See, e.g., Al Cooper & Eric Griffin-Shelley, Introduction: The Internet: The Next 
Sexual Revolution, in SEX & THE INTERNET: A GUIDEBOOK FOR CLINICIANS 1, 2 (Al 
Cooper ed., 2002). 
32 See, e.g., ADULTFRIENDFINDER, http://adultfriendfinder.com (last visited Mar. 13, 
2014). 
33 HIVAdultDating.com explains to users “[n]ow it is safe to conduct yourself openly 
without fear of judgment, here you will feel that peaceful feeling of acceptance. Allow 
yourself the opportunity to date freely and free of stress, allow yourself to feel relaxed and 
relieved with the other HIV positive singles from all around the world.” HIVADULT 
DATING, http://www.hivadultdating.com/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2014). 
34 Fan, supra note 23, at 544. 
35 Id. 
36 Burris et al., supra note 7, at 469. 
37 The ambiguous consent and disclosure provisions prevent HIV-positive individuals 
from structuring their actions accordingly and may frustrate the purposes of the statute. 
One study found that “[HIV-positive] people’s misunderstanding [of consent and 
disclosure] could lead them to think wrongly that their actions (and inactions) are not 
prohibited by law.” Catherine Dodds et al., Responses to Criminal Prosecutions for HIV 
Transmission Among Gay Men with HIV in England and Wales, 17 REPROD. HEALTH 
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consent be inferred from the circumstances? Does indicating one’s serostatus via 
an Internet dating profile constitute disclosure? The answers to these questions are 
uncertain. One scholar noted, “choosing to run the risk [of HIV exposure] with 
‘informed consent’—disclosure—is morally different from being involuntarily 
exposed, but in real life disclosure and consent may look more like an avian 
mating ritual than the negotiation of a business contract . . . .”38 The discussion 
below seeks to highlight the manifest difficulties in legally ascertaining disclosure 
and consent in the sexual context. 
 
1.  Consent to Exposure 
 
Consent has the power to be morally and legally transformative.39 This is 
particularly true when lack of consent is an element of the crime itself.40 While 
consent is difficult to ascertain in the rape context, added difficulties arise in the 
HIV-exposure context. When determining whether sex was consensual in the rape 
context, the relevant inquiry is whether the partner consented to the act itself. 
Whether there is indicia of physical resistance, incapacity, or signs of emotional 
oppression, signals of nonconsent to an act are more outwardly apparent.41 
Professor David Archard writes that consent to sexual relations “is an act rather 
than a state of mind.”42 However, in the HIV-exposure context, consent to a risk is 
a subjective state of mind. Absent verbal discourse, indicators of consent or 
nonconsent to a risk are not easily ascertainable. That is, lack of consent to a risk is 
not revealed through obvious behavioral and physical signals that would place an 
HIV-positive person on notice that his or her partner does not consent to the risk of 
HIV exposure. Moreover, a blanket assumption that no partner would consent to 
the risk of HIV exposure may be inconsistent with an HIV-positive individual’s 
past experiences and understanding about certain sexual behaviors. Indeed, there 
are many complicated reasons why individuals, including HIV-negative persons, 
may choose to assume certain health risks—particularly in the context of sexual 
MATTERS 135, 143 (2009). Indeed “[b]y legitimating risk-taking via consent and 
disclosure . . . the law affirms the need to disclose and to gain consent. The problem is that 
in the absence of a clear understanding of what this means . . . some diagnosed people will 
place themselves at risk of prosecution.” Id. 
38 Burris et al., supra note 7, at 509. 
39 Alan Wertheimer, What Is Consent? And Is It Important?, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 
557, 559 (2000). 
40 Kaplan, supra note 8, at 1546. 
41 See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno et al., Panel Discussion, Men, Women and Rape, 63 
FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 171 (1994) (“There are occasionally cases that happen that way, 
but most of the time the signals that the victim has given, whether verbally or physically, 
are very clear. There is very little rape that is due to failure to communicate . . . .” (quoting 
Linda Fairstein, Chief, Sex Crimes Prosecution Unit and Deputy Chief, N.Y. County 
District Attorney’s Office)). 
42 DAVID ARCHARD, SEXUAL CONSENT 4 (1998); Wertheimer, supra note 39, at 567 
n.16.  
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relations and HIV.43 As a result, it is more likely that an HIV-positive person may 
honestly believe his or her partner consented. 
Without explicit verbal dialogue,44 HIV-positive people look to their 
surroundings to determine whether their partner consented to the risk of HIV 
exposure.45 Because consent to the risk of HIV is subjective in nature, the HIV-
positive individual must make certain assumptions about his or her partner’s 
consent based on the circumstances.46  
 
Does seeking sex in a bath house equal consent to HIV exposure? . . . If 
you don’t ask, does that mean I don’t have to tell? People may rely on 
contextual signals, assuming that a partner in a public sex venue who 
does not insist on safer sex has assumed the risk, or consented to the 
possibility of infection by engaging in risky behavior without inquiring 
about a partner’s HIV serostatus.47 
 
As set forth above, there is a range of circumstances that may give rise to 
assumptions about partner consent. But when are these assumptions valid at law? 
And what degree of culpability, if any, should the law attach to these assumptions? 
The current state of the law on consent in the HIV-exposure context fails to 
provide answers to these questions. Moreover, HIV-transmission statutes do not 
account for circumstances where an individual honestly believed his partner 
consented to the risk of HIV exposure.48 And mistaken beliefs are relevant to an 
43 See infra Part III.B.4 (discussing reasons why HIV-negative individuals may accept 
the risk of HIV exposure); see also Fadhila Mazanderani, An Ethics of Intimacy: Online 
Dating, Viral-Sociality and Living with HIV, 7 BIOSOCIETIES 393, 400 (2012) (noting the 
“complexity of managing risk in the context of intimate relations and HIV,” and how 
“[i]ntimacy and risk management do not, it seems, blend well together”). 
44 Studies suggest that in some communities, nonverbal negotiation of consent and 
disclosure is the norm. See ADAM BOURNE ET AL., RELATIVE SAFETY II: RISK AND 
UNPROTECTED ANAL INTERCOURSE AMONG GAY MEN WITH DIAGNOSED HIV 19 (2009), 
available at http://www.sigmaresearch.org.uk/files/report2009d.pdf (“There were those 
who were much more direct about disclosing their own HIV status to all partners, as well 
as always eliciting information about partners’ knowledge of their own status. However, 
they constitute a minority of those taking part in this research.”); Dodds et al., supra note 
37, at 142 (“Analysis within and across interview transcripts revealed that few men 
disclosed their status in a clear and explicit manner. . . . [M]any respondents made what 
they felt to be a disclosure of their status, but which had the potential to be misunderstood 
by sexual partners.”). 
45 See Dodds et al., supra note 37, at 142. 
46 See id. 
47 Burris et al., supra note 7, at 480. 
48 See Erin E. Langley & Dominic J. Nardi, Jr., The Irony of Outlawing AIDS: A 
Human Rights Argument Against the Criminalization of HIV Transmission, 11 GEO. J. 
GENDER & L. 743, 778 (2010). 
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individual’s moral blameworthiness.49 Considering the purely subjective nature of 
consenting to a risk and the good-faith mistakes that may follow, the statutes 
should account for a defendant’s degree of culpability vis-à-vis partner consent.50 
Grading offenses based on knowledge,51 recklessness,52 and negligence53 would 
better ensure that a defendant will not become subject to disproportionate 
punishment.54  
 
2.  Disclosure of Serostatus 
 
Like consent, the measures an individual must take to “disclose” his or her 
serostatus are unclear under state statutes.55 While case law is limited in this area, 
one Ohio court found that verbal disclosure sufficiently reveals one’s positive HIV 
status; that written, signed, and notarized disclosure is unnecessary; and that after 
initial disclosure, an individual would not be guilty for any subsequent sexual 
encounters with that same partner.56 While verbal disclosure may be sufficient, 
courts have yet to describe it as mandatory. It remains uncertain whether disclosure 
can be inferred from circumstances.  
49 See Kaplan, supra note 8, at 1545 (“[L]egislatures that determine that reckless 
conduct should be criminally liable should require the prosecutor to demonstrate that the 
defendant ignored a substantial and unjustifiable risk of transmission.”). 
50 The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) recommends 
against the use of criminal law in circumstances where the person “honestly and reasonably 
believed the other person was aware of his or her status through some other means.” 
UNAIDS, ENDING OVERLY BROAD CRIMINALISATION OF HIV NON-DISCLOSURE, 
EXPOSURE AND TRANSMISSION: CRITICAL SCIENTIFIC, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 26 (2013) [hereinafter UNAIDS GUIDANCE NOTE]. 
51 “A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when . . . 
he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist” or if “he is 
aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.” MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 2.02 (2)(b) (1985). 
52 “A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists 
or will result from his conduct.” Id. § 2.02 (2)(c). 
53 “A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he 
should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or 
will result from his conduct.” Id. § 2.02 (2)(d). 
54 See infra Part III.C.1. 
55 See, e.g., Taylor Craig Newbold, Full Disclosure: Idaho’s HIV Disclosure Laws 
Causing Their Own Issues, BOISEWEEKLY (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.boiseweekly.com/b 
oise/full-disclosure-idahos-hiv-disclosure-laws-causing-their-own-issues/Content?oid=280 
3038 (noting how Idaho’s “statute does not stipulate what exactly constitutes disclosure”). 
56 See State v. Gonzalez, 796 N.E.2d 12, 22 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (“A person of 
common intelligence would understand that verbal disclosure effectively and sufficiently 
reveals the information. A person of common intelligence would also understand that once 
the person being told hears and comprehends the information, the person is not likely to 
forget such a significant revelation, and does not need to be told each time before further 
intimacies.”). 
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The contextual circumstances that contribute to the mistaken assumption of 
partner consent will likely be the same circumstances that lead to the determination 
that disclosure is not necessary. HIV-positive individuals may employ “a range of 
proxy behaviours which they believe[] to be a simulation of disclosure, and . . . 
[will] generate a fair idea of their partners’ status.”57 For example, the “Code of the 
Condom” holds that “[t]he person who assiduously uses condoms has no 
obligation . . . [to] inform his prospective sexual partners of his HIV status, even 
when he knows himself to be infected.”58 In this scenario, the HIV-positive 
individual’s assumption that his partner is familiar with the “Code of the 
Condom”—a community norm—may enlighten his decision that disclosure is 
unnecessary. The “Code of the Condom” raises another important consideration 
discussed in detail below; assumptions about community norms influence 
disclosure. Indeed, individuals living with HIV “live and work in a complicated 
array of circumstances,” and whether the influence of community norms or fear of 
personal harm, disclosure may not always be the most appropriate response.59  
Lastly, transmission laws containing disclosure provisions alone fail to 
adequately protect others.60 Disclosure alone does not ensure that a partner had the 
information necessary to make an educated choice concerning his or her own 
health. Unlike consent, disclosure can occur without a partner’s awareness of the 
57 BOURNE ET AL., supra note 44, at 19. 
58 Lazzarini et al., supra note 2, at 249 (quoting David L. Chambers, Gay Men, AIDS, 
and the Code of the Condom, 29 HARV C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353, 353 (1994)). Condom use 
does not absolve an HIV-positive person from criminal liability in most states. See, e.g., 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-608 (2011); MO. ANN. STAT. § 191.677(4) (West 2011); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 39-13-109 (Supp. 2013). California, however, provides an exception for 
condom use. See CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120291 (West 2012). 
59 Aziza Ahmed & Beri Hull, Sex and HIV Disclosure, 38 HUM. RTS. 11, 13 (2011). 
Scholars have noted that in certain situations, nondisclosure may be the product of power 
imbalances between partners and fear of physical harm. See Kane Race, Framing 
Responsibility: HIV, Biomedical Prevention, and the Performativity of the Law, 9 J. 
BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 327, 331 n.3 (2012) (“The very idea of disclosure assumes that sex 
takes place face-to-face between partners of equal power and with some impetus to speak.” 
(quoting Heather Worth et al., Reckless Vectors: The Infecting “Other” in HIV/AIDS Law, 
2 SEXUALITY RES. & SOC. POL’Y 3, 10 (2005)); Leslie E. Wolf & Richard Vezina, Crime 
and Punishment: Is There A Role for Criminal Law in HIV Prevention Policy?, 25 
WHITTIER L. REV. 821, 874 (2004) (“Reasons for non-disclosure are complex. In some 
cases, people need to learn skills to help them disclose, something that some public health 
prevention programs address. In other cases, disclosure may place people at risk of other 
harm.” (citation omitted)). 
60 Kaplan, supra note 8, at 1534–35; see, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.11(B) 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2013) (“No person, with knowledge that the person has tested positive 
as a carrier of a virus that causes [AIDS], shall knowingly . . . [e]ngage in sexual conduct 
with another person without disclosing that knowledge to the other person prior to 
engaging in the sexual conduct . . . .”). 
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corresponding risks of HIV exposure.61 For example, the exposed partner may be 
intoxicated such that he or she could not appreciate the risks involved. Awareness, 
on the other hand, can occur without disclosure.62 As discussed above, risk 
awareness can be derived from circumstances alone. “While disclosure is evidence 
of awareness of risk, the two are not coextensive.”63 Thus, if criminal-transmission 
statutes are to protect those powerless to protect themselves from the health risks 
associated with HIV exposure, disclosure language must be discarded. 
 
3.  Burdening Privacy Rights 
 
As implied in the previous subsection, neither legislatures nor courts have 
defined whether verbal consent and disclosure is mandatory. The Internet 
introduces a platform where serostatus can be communicated nonverbally and 
consent can be negotiated based on the circumstances. For example, one’s 
presence on an HIV-specific dating site discloses serostatus and contextually 
communicates consent to exposure.64 Where it is unclear whether the exposure 
statutes impose a mandatory verbal disclosure and consent rule, criminal laws may 
reach private, consensual sexual conduct. 
As discussed in detail below, there are many complicated reasons why HIV-
negative individuals may wish to expose themselves to the virus,65 and the right to 
privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment may protect an individual’s interest to 
do so.66 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the privacy right includes an 
“interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.”67 After 
first identifying the unenumerated substantive-due-process right of privacy in 
Griswold v. Connecticut,68 the Supreme Court has spent nearly four decades 
determining its reach.69 Lawrence v. Texas70 served as a “powerful affirmation of a 
61 See Kaplan, supra note 8, at 1534–35 (discussing various reasons disclosure of HIV 
status may not by itself reduce the risk of HIV transmission). 
62 Id. (without disclosure “an individual may know her partner’s serostatus . . . or may 
be unsure of a partner’s serostatus but be aware of the risk of transmission.”). But see R. v. 
Cuerrier, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371, 372 (Can.) (“Without disclosure of HIV status there cannot 
be a true consent.”). 
63 See Kaplan, supra note 8, at 1534. 
64 See discussion infra Part III.B.4. 
65 See infra text accompanying notes 120–123. 
66 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–54 (1973) (“[T]he right [to privacy] has some 
extension to activities relating to . . . contraception . . . .”). 
67 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977) (citations omitted). 
68 381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965).  
69 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S 558, 567 (2003) (finding that the right to 
privacy encompasses the rights of adults to engage in private, consensual sexual conduct); 
Roe, 410 U.S. at 154 (finding the “right of personal privacy includes the abortion 
decision”). 
70 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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right to privacy.”71 Lawrence recognized that the right to privacy extended to 
private, consensual sexual relations.72 Although the Court neither described this 
right as fundamental nor articulate a level of scrutiny, scholars suggest that laws 
infringing upon this right must meet some form of heightened scrutiny.73 
Assuming laws concerning the right to private, consensual sexual activity are 
subject to heightened scrutiny, it follows that “[t]he means chosen must be more 
than a reasonable way of attaining” the state’s policy objective.74 Whether laws 
implicating this right are subject to some form of intermediate or strict scrutiny, 
such laws must be “narrowly tailored” to achieve the state’s goals.75 
In light of the reasoning above, the ambiguities surrounding the consent and 
disclosure provisions in the HIV-exposure statutes may offend constitutional 
principles. Because the right to consensual sexual activity is protected, thus 
demanding some form of heightened scrutiny, HIV-exposure laws need to be 
narrowly tailored such that only culpable behavior is punished. Online dating sites 
make nonverbal disclosure and consent possible. With no guiding standards as to 
whether nonverbal consent and disclosure is legally permissible, prosecutors may 
bring charges against HIV-positive individuals for engaging in private, consensual 
sexual activity—constitutionally protected behavior. Given the stigma that already 
accompanies HIV,76 the chances are greater that wholly nonculpable behavior will 
become subject to selective, morality-based prosecutions.77 
 
71 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 868 (4th 
ed. 2011). 
72 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
73 Dean Erwin Chemerinsky highlights two reasons why laws implicating the right to 
private, consensual sexual activity may be subject to heightened scrutiny. First, the 
Lawrence court relied on past privacy cases where strict scrutiny was applied. Second, the 
State of Texas’s proffered justification for its deviate sexual intercourse law—advancing 
moral interests—would traditionally satisfy rational basis review. However, the law was 
invalidated in this case. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 71, at 868. 
74 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 71, at 553. 
75 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 569−70 (2001) (holding 
that some regulations reviewed under intermediate scrutiny do not need to be the least 
restrictive alternative, but must be narrowly tailored and substantially related to the state’s 
goals); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 279−80 (1986) (explaining that 
strict scrutiny analysis mandates that laws be narrowly tailored to accomplish a compelling 
state purpose). 
76 Jane K. Stoever, Stories Absent from the Courtroom: Responding to Domestic 
Violence in the Context of HIV and AIDS, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1157, 1185−86 (2009) 
(explaining how discrimination against people living with HIV is “rampant”); see also 
Kaplan, supra note 8, at 1536 (“Criminalizing sexual activity regardless of the actual risk it 
poses uses criminal law’s expressive purpose of condemnation to endorse this stigma.”). 
77 Cf. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 71, at 970 (explaining how vague laws restricting 
speech can create a risk of selective prosecution because under vague laws “the 
government can choose who[m] to prosecute based on their views or politics” without clear 
notice of what conduct is prohibited). 
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B.  Consent, Disclosure, and Online Dating 
 
The consent and disclosure provisions in HIV-transmission statutes disregard 
the complexities involved in negotiating sex. The Internet adds a new layer of 
complication.78 As discussed in Part II.C, the Internet has become an important 
venue for people to meet sexual and romantic partners,79 and many HIV-positive 
individuals enjoy the conveniences of online disclosure. Given the Internet’s 
popularity as a means to seek partners and the conveniences of online disclosure, it 
is logical to assume that the Internet would encourage candor and facilitate the 
effective negotiation of consent and disclosure. However, the Internet forum 
actually may frustrate these purposes. 
One study noted how concern among HIV-positive individuals about “the 
lack of control they now exercised over . . . personal information meant they were 
now rarely open about their HIV status among friends and acquaintances.”80 These 
individuals were reluctant to be candid about their HIV status and safer sex 
practices on social sexual networking sites.81 
Moreover, design features of online dating profiles restructure sexual 
negotiation, giving rise to new assumptions about a partner’s HIV status and 
normalizing ambiguous disclosure practices.82 For example, one study observed 
how routine prompting of HIV status on profiles may alter the practices and 
expectations of those navigating the online dating context.83 “Where previously, 
HIV-negative men were encouraged to presume all their sexual partners were 
potentially HIV-positive and modify their sexual practice accordingly, increasingly 
they are much more likely to presume their partners are HIV-negative unless 
circumstances (such as reluctance to disclose HIV status) indicate otherwise.”84 
While in some cases, the Internet may break down initial barriers to HIV 
disclosure and encourage frank discussions about HIV status and partner consent, 
the Internet itself is often the barrier to these frank discussions. In the online dating 
78 Nicolas Sheon & G. Michael Crosby, Ambivalent Tales of HIV Disclosure in San 
Francisco, 58 SOC. SCI. & MED. 2105, 2116 (2004) (noting that the Internet has 
“dramatically affected the calculus of risk and norms of disclosure”). 
79 Mary D. Fan, Decentralizing STD Surveillance: Toward Better Informed Sexual 
Consent, 12 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 18–22 (2012). It is worth noting that 
numerous HIV-positive individuals already have been prosecuted for exposing partners 
they met online to the virus. See, e.g., Boise Man Charged with Transferring HIV, IDAHO 
PRESS TRIB. (Sept. 14, 2010, 12:59 PM), http://www.idahopress.com/news/article_bbfc76a 
c-c032-11df-9d38-001cc4c002e0.html; Man Given 25 Years for Not Disclosing HIV, 
QCONLINE, (May 02, 2009, 11:11 PM), http://qconline.com/archives/qco/display.php?id=4 
37798; Patricia M. Murret, Man Accused of Exposing Woman to HIV, GAZETTE.NET, (Apr. 
29, 2009), http://ww2.gazette.net/stories/04292009/gaitnew205325_32520.shtml. 
80 Dodds et al., supra note 37, at 141. 
81 Id. 
82 See Kane Race, Click Here for HIV Status: Shifting Templates of Sexual 
Negotiation, 3 EMOTION, SPACE & SOC’Y 7, 8–11 (2010). 
83 Id. at 13. 
84 Id. 
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environment, context may speak loudly and effectively. When it does, users glean 
the same information from the context (i.e., an individual’s HIV-positive status) 
and share a common understanding based on this information.85 However, in some 
instances, context does not speak as effectively as one may assume. In these 
instances, good-faith mistakes are likely to occur—mistakes about a partner’s 
consent to HIV exposure among them.86  
This Note proposes four scenarios where the various problems surrounding 
disclosure and consent may manifest in the context of online dating. Although 
these scenarios are hypothetical, they are informed by findings from studies and 
interviews with HIV-positive and -negative e-daters. The first three scenarios serve 
to show how various assumptions about online dating community norms may lead 
to mistakes regarding partner consent. The fourth scenario provides a situation 
where criminal liability may attach to constitutionally protected private, consensual 
sexual conduct.  
 
1.  Serostatus Displayed on an Online Dating Profile 
 
In this scenario, the HIV-positive e-dater—let’s call him Bob—posts his 
serostatus prominently on his profile. Angela, an HIV-negative e-dater does not 
notice the serostatus and later engages in sexual intercourse with Bob. In this 
scenario, Bob believes verbal disclosure is unnecessary because he indicated his 
serostatus on his online profile.87 He assumes, in good faith, his partner knew he 
was HIV positive.  
Bob’s assumption that Angela consented to exposure was further informed by 
one online dating community norm called “serosorting.” Serosorting is an HIV-
prevention practice88 where individuals select romantic or sexual partners based on 
those that share an identical serostatus.89 Potential partners may rely on Internet 
profiles for serosorting.90 Based on Bob’s understanding that serosorting is 
85 See infra Part III.B.4. 
86 See infra Parts III.C.1–3. 
87 According to one study, “[n]arratives that described Internet cruising suggested that 
personal profiles eliminate the need to discuss status in person, or even online.” Sheon & 
Crosby, supra note 78, at 2112.  
88 The Center for Disease Control and Prevention explicitly states that it does not 
recommend serosorting as a safer sex practice. It cautions, “[s]erosorting is not 
recommended because: (1) too many MSM [men seeking men] who have HIV do not know 
they are infected because they have not been tested for HIV recently, (2) men’s 
assumptions about the HIV status of their partners may be wrong, and (3) some HIV-
positive men may not tell or may misrepresent their HIV status.” Serosorting Among Gay, 
Bisexual and Other Men Who Have Sex with Men, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/msmhealth/Serosorting.htm (last updated Oct. 24, 2011). 
89 Kaplan, supra note 8, at 1563. 
90 DANIEL E. SICONOLFI & ROBERT W. MOELLER, SEROSORTING, 19 BETA 45, 45 
(2007), available at http://img.thebody.com/sfaf/pdfs/winter07_serosorting.pdf. One study 
“found that the [I]nternet was generally regarded by HIV-positive men as a safer space in 
which they could signal their HIV status to other positive men.” Race, supra note 82, at 11. 
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common practice within HIV online dating circles, he assumes there is a high 
probability that Angela engages in the practice of serosorting.91 In other words, 
Bob believed Angela was HIV positive as well. Under these good-faith 
assumptions, Bob does not disclose his status. Indeed, studies have confirmed that 
perceptions about a partner’s HIV status often influence an individual’s decision to 
disclose.92 As demonstrated in this scenario, assumptions based on e-dating norms 
and the ability of the Internet to communicate serostatus propagate mistaken 
beliefs about consent and disclosure.  
 
2.  Code-Word Disclosure 
 
In this scenario, Ralph, a homosexual HIV-positive e-dater, relies on cultural 
code words to communicate his serostatutus via his online dating profile. The 
responding partner, Stuart, is HIV negative and does not understand the cue word 
Ralph used. Without knowing Ralph was HIV-positive, Stuart engages in sexual 
intercourse with Ralph after responding to Ralph’s Internet dating profile.  
The use of code language largely results from e-daters’ desires to present 
themselves in a favorable light or to avoid the unsexy conversation accompanying 
dialogue about HIV. As one scholar noted, “because of the self-advertising 
imperative in the online marketplace for sex and romance, ads and representations 
may be deliberately opaque, euphemistic, ambiguous, and suggestive.”93 For 
example, one study found that some e-daters disposed of the box indicating their 
HIV serostatus on Gay.com (an online dating site).94 Instead they specified that 
they practiced safe sex “sometimes,” instead of “always.”95 In a sexier manner, 
these modifications served as a discrete code suggesting they were HIV-positive.96 
An interviewee in the study expressed this sentiment: 
 
I don’t disclose. I still just find it very embarrassing I don’t mind telling 
you. It’s one of those things. It’s not great leading to sex. It’s like putting 
the goddamned condom on in the first place. There is nothing sexy about 
discussing you’re HIV positive prior to doing the deed . . . if you put 
‘sometimes’ or ‘never’ for safe sex on your profile, everyone assumes.97  
 
91 See Dodds et al., supra note 37, at 142 (“Just as disclosure was sometimes 
ambiguous, so were the practices that some men described as ‘ensuring’ they knew whether 
their sexual partners also had HIV. Actually, gaining unequivocal understanding of sexual 
partners’ HIV infection was rare.”). 
92 Robert Klitzman et al., It’s Not Just What You Say: Relationships of HIV 
Disclosure and Risk Reduction Among MSM in the Post-HAART Era, 19 AIDS CARE: 
PSYCHOL. SOCIO-MED. ASPECTS AIDS/HIV 749, 749–51 (2007). 
93 Fan, supra note 79, at 27–28. 
94 Davis et al., supra note 30, at 468–70, 472. 
95 Id. at 469–70. 
96 Fan, supra note 79, at 28. 
97 Davis et al., supra note 30, at 470. 
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Suggesting serostatus by expressing desire for unprotected sex may be a painless 
and sexy way for this interviewee to disclose his status.98 
Others may use explicit images of unsafe sex to communicate serostatus. 
Consider the following conversation between an interviewer and interviewee: 
 
MD: So how do you present yourself on the website? Do you 
say you are positive? 
Interviewee: I used to do and I deleted that part of my profile. If people 
ask me the question I will always tell the truth. If you look 
at my site, my name and the fact that I say I never practise 
safe sex and just look at the pictures that I have got posted 
there. Quite frankly if you have to ask the question then 
you’re being pretty damn naïve . . . . 99 
 
Turning back to our fictional characters, Ralph, in good faith, assumed Stuart 
understood that practicing safe sex “sometimes” constituted disclosure of his 
serostatus. In other words, he engaged in a “proxy behaviour[] . . . believed to be a 
simulation of disclosure.”100 Ralph’s assumptions about Stuart’s understanding of 
online community code and norms informed his decision that disclosure was 
unnecessary.  
Ralph’s experience is parallel to that of one e-dater who was a respondent in a 
British study that explored instances of unprotected sex among homosexual men 
diagnosed with HIV.101 This man recounted an incident where he initially assumed 
his partner was aware of his HIV-positive status.102 Sensing his partner was not 
aware of his serostatus, however, the man mentioned he was “poz”; his partner 
then responded, “[w]hat does poz mean?”103 The man characterized this experience 
as a “learning point” where he realized that “even though [a serostatus reference] is 
down on my profile[,] . . . I have to get back to how it used to be where I don’t 
make that assumption . . . .”104 His experience highlights how online dating more 
readily fosters mistaken assumptions about partner consent—assumptions that he 
would not have made in more traditional social settings.  
Ralph and the British interviewee communicated serostatus using language 
they understood to be common parlance in the online dating community. 
Nevertheless, their partners were unfamiliar with this vocabulary. The examples in 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 468.  
100 BOURNE ET AL., supra note 44, at 19 (characterizing one’s “ticking ‘safer sex to be 
discussed’ on an online profile” as one of these “proxy behaviors”). Id. Similar to Ralph’s 
assumption, the Relative Safety II researchers found that “[a] large number of respondents 
who used [online dating sites] indicated that safe sex ‘needs discussion’ on their user 
profile, believing this to be a clear indicator of their HIV infection.” Id. at 26. 
101 Id. at 26. 
102 Id.  
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
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this section serve to reemphasize how assumptions about online community norms 
may lead to good-faith mistakes regarding partner disclosure and consent. 
 
3.  The Adult Dating Site 
 
This scenario concerns Lola and Jack, two individuals who meet on an adult 
dating site. Lola is HIV positive, and Jack is HIV negative. Without discussing 
serostatus, the two engage in casual, unprotected sex. Given the risks that arise 
from engaging in casual, unprotected sex with partners met over the Internet—
among them, the risk of contracting HIV—Lola assumed that Jack consented to the 
risk of exposure. 
Assumptions about the behaviors of online sex seekers inform the HIV-
positive individual’s determination of whether disclosure is necessary.105 The risk 
of HIV infection is heightened when “[o]nline sex-seekers are more apt to engage 
in riskier behaviors, such as casual sex and concurrent partnerships.”106 The 
Internet also enables “targeted shopping among searchable personals for someone 
amenable to riskier modes of sex, such as ‘barebacking’—the practice of anal or 
vaginal sex without a condom.”107 Lola’s assumption that Jack was receptive to 
sexual risk-taking with concurrent partners led her to the conclusion that he 
consented to the risk of exposure. 
Additionally, Lola’s experience with past partners, who all took measures to 
mitigate the risk of exposure, led her to believe that Jack consented because he did 
not inquire about her status. Studies show that people acknowledge the risks 
involved with engaging in casual sex with partners met over the Internet. Around 
64% of people ages eighteen to twenty-four have discussed their HIV status with 
partners met online.108 Meanwhile, approximately 75% of persons aged twenty-
five and older inquired about HIV status with online partners.109 An HIV-positive 
person might believe that because past partners inquired about serostatus110 or used 
105 For some individuals, nondisclosure about being HIV-positive or HIV-negative is 
accepted as a norm in the casual encounter context. For example, consider the comments of 
this HIV-negative interviewee: “It must be so impossible to disclose, particularly in a 
casual situation. I don’t think disclosure is a responsibility. It’s a bonus. I just think 
everyone’s potentially HIV positive, that’s how I deal with it.” Race, supra note 82, at 11. 
This man, along with other men interviewed in this study, adhere to the “traditional policy 
of assuming any of their casual partners could be HIV-positive”—a policy “situated in 
terms of the norms of non-disclosure that have operated historically in many casual sex 
contexts.” Id.  
106 Fan, supra note 23, at 554; see also Fan, supra note 79, at 27–28. 
107 Fan, supra note 23, at 554. 
108 Mary McFarlane et al., Young Adults on the Internet: Risk Behaviors for Sexually 
Transmitted Diseases and HIV, 31 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 11, 14, tbl.2 (2002). 
109 Id. 
110 See Race, supra note 82, at 12 (interviewing one HIV-negative man who explained 
that he “always asked” about his partner’s serostatus before having unprotected sex).  
 
                                                     
694 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 3 
a condom,111 the partner who does not take these precautions consents to the risk 
of exposure. 
In the context of online sex-seeking, an HIV-positive person may believe 
one’s partner has a greater responsibility to mitigate the risks of HIV exposure.112 
She assumes that the risks flowing from casual sex with Internet partners are 
apparent. Furthermore, her experience with past partners, who all took precautions, 
lend credence to the belief that sexual partners will always inquire about serostatus 
if they are truly concerned. Under these assumptions, she feels her responsibility to 
disclose is negated. Indeed, “[s]tudies of HIV-positive people who fail to disclose 
their status to sexual partners indicate that one commonly proffered reason for not 
disclosing was that individuals felt a lessened sense of responsibility or concern for 
the sexual partner in the casual encounter context.”113 The world of online sex-
seeking alters perceptions about rights, responsibilities, and disclosure.114 As a 
result, the Internet dating site, as a medium for casual sex-seeking, more readily 
fosters mistaken assumptions about disclosure and consent. 
 
4.  Communications over an HIV-Specific Dating Site 
 
Run a standard Google search using the key words “HIV” and “online 
dating,” and dozens of dating sites targeting the HIV-positive population appear. 
As discussed above, HIV-specific dating sites permit individuals to reveal their 
positive status to prospective partners without the discomfort involved with face-
to-face disclosure.115 Some of the HIV dating sites even seek to attract potential 
members by appealing to the fear of disclosure.116 In this context, disclosure occurs 
nonverbally in two ways. First, presence on the dating site itself may serve as a 
means of disclosure,117 and second, serostatus may be explicitly revealed on one’s 
dating profile. Thus, membership on an HIV dating site, or serostatus disclosure 
via profile, replaces verbal disclosure and may discourage frank discussions. 
111 See id. at 11 (stating that a number of HIV-negative men found that “the use 
of condoms tended to substitute for the need to know their partner’s HIV status”). 
112 See Ahmed & Hull, supra note 59, at 12. 
113 Fan, supra note 79, at 22; see also Dodds et al., supra note 37, at 141 (finding that 
some HIV-positive individuals believed that anonymous, casual sexual settings carried a 
lower risk of prosecution because they assumed that “people in such environments knew 
and accepted the risks”). 
114 See Ahmed & Hull, supra note 59, at 12. 
115 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.  
116 See, e.g., HIVDATING, http://www.hiv-dating.org/ (“If you’re looking for love and 
companionship without the fear of judgment and disclosure, you’ve come to the right 
place!”) (last visited Mar. 20, 2014). 
117 Profiles on certain HIV-specific dating sites may make no mention of serostatus at 
all to avoid identification of oneself in terms of an illness. See Whitney Digilio & Kate 
Klonick, Online Dating Helps People With AIDS, HIV, ABC NEWS (Dec. 1, 2006), http://abcnews. 
go.com/Health/story?id=2690839&page=1#.UHcfchXA-Jp. 
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For most individuals, HIV-positive dating sites serve as a forum where HIV-
positive individuals go to forge a relationship. However, HIV-negative individuals 
may be active on these sites as well. In February of 2003, an article appeared in 
Rolling Stone Magazine identifying a practice called “bug chasing.”118 The author 
described “bug chasers” as HIV-negative gay men who actively seek infection 
from HIV-positive individuals.119 While this practice has been questioned as myth, 
studies have shown the phenomenon does exist among a minority of gay men.120 In 
many ways, the subculture is driven by Internet dating forums; “[t]he Internet has 
proven itself a powerful tool in linking individuals with similar, and in some cases, 
marginalised interests.”121 
The bug-chasing subculture exemplifies the many complicated reasons why 
individuals accept certain health risks.122 So, why might a person want to contract 
HIV? Researchers have suggested several themes. First, bug chasers may believe 
that infection is inevitable and contracting HIV eliminates uncertainty and fosters a 
sense of relief.123 Meanwhile, others may view sex without condoms as erotic and 
dangerous.124 Researchers also suggest that bug chasers may pursue infection to 
escape loneliness or may do so to gain a sense of empowerment by “preemptively 
fulfilling . . . negative societal labels.”125  
Given the reasons why an HIV-negative person may seek exposure, this Note 
proposes one last scenario. Lars is an HIV-positive homosexual male who is active 
on an HIV-specific dating site. Fearing HIV infection is inevitable, Gus, who is 
HIV negative, decides to take control and engage in sexual relations with Lars. 
Lars believes verbal disclosure is not necessary because his presence on an HIV-
positive dating site speaks for itself. He believes responding potential partners are 
HIV positive or, possibly for one of the reasons discussed above, otherwise willing 
118 Gregory A. Freeman, In Search of Death, ROLLING STONE, Feb. 6, 2003, at 44. 
119 Id. 
120 CHRISTIAN GROV & JEFFREY T. PARSONS, Bug Chasing and Gift Giving: The 
Potential for HIV Transmission Among Barebackers on the Internet, 18 AIDS EDUC. 
PREVENTION 490, 490–91 (2006) (This data suggests that “bug chasing and gift giving do 
exist; however a sizable portion of both bug chasers and gift givers were not intent on 
spreading HIV”). “Gift giving” refers to “HIV-positive men who seek to pass HIV to 
seronegative men . . . .” Id.  
121 Christian Grov, Barebacking Websites: Electronic Environments for Reducing or 
Inducing HIV Risk, 18 AIDS CARE 990, 995 (2006). “The Internet, and specifically 
websites devoted to barebacking, has also been connected to the emerging phenomena of 
gift giving and bug chasing.” Id. at 991.  
122 “Intimacy and risk management do not, it seems, blend well together, as has been 
vividly illustrated in research on the subculture of ‘barebacking’ and the active pursuit of 
HIV infection (‘bug chasing’) among gay men.” See Mazanderani, supra note 43, at 400. 
123 Grov & Parsons, supra note 120, at 492; see also Richard Pendry, HIV ‘Bug 
Chasers’: Fantasy or Fact?, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/4895012.stm 
(last updated Apr. 10, 2006, 10:22 PM) (describing one man’s feelings as “welcom[ing] the 
‘inevitable’” as he learned of his diagnosis of being HIV positive). 
124 GROV & PARSONS, supra note 120, at 492. 
125 Id. 
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to assume the risk of HIV exposure. Under these assumptions, Lars and Gus never 
discuss one another’s serostatus and engage in private, consensual sexual relations. 
As discussed in Part II.A.3, private, consensual sexual relations are a 
protected privacy right under the Fourteenth Amendment. Supposing Gus presses 
charges, and Lars is ultimately convicted under an HIV-exposure statute, Lars 
would be convicted of a crime based on the exercise of his own constitutional 
rights. For purposes of examination, this scenario is presented hypothetically in the 
Internet dating context. However, there are reported cases where a consenting 
partner ultimately decides to press charges, often for retaliatory purposes, against 
an HIV-positive partner.126 It is possible that this scenario has already played out in 
real life as sexual relations risking HIV exposure generally occur in private and 
beyond the purview of witnesses.127 Thus, fact finders are generally presented with 
“he said, she said” testimony at trial.128 
 
C.  Suggested Remedies 
 
Consent to sexual relations is expressed through action, whereas consent to a 
risk is a state of mind.129 Without uttering a word, nonconsent to an act can be 
ascertained by physical indicators. However, in the absence of a verbal exchange, 
it is difficult to determine nonconsent to the risk of HIV exposure. Invariably, an 
HIV-positive person will be mistaken about his need to disclose based on 
misunderstanding about his partner’s consent. Where courts have yet to impose a 
mandate of verbal disclosure and consent, it is tempting to advocate for an 
affirmative consent and disclosure requirement to rectify problems of mistake. A 
verbal mandate would be the most effective way to prevent misunderstandings 
concerning consent to HIV exposure. Aside from the practical considerations 
surrounding the question of how this approach could be incorporated into our legal 
system,130 imposing a verbal-permission rule every time an HIV-positive 
126 For example, in one reported Canadian case, a woman was charged with 
aggravated sexual assault for not disclosing her HIV-positive status to her boyfriend when 
they began dating five years earlier. At some point, they broke up, and the man was 
charged with assault in response to complaints of domestic violence against the woman. In 
retaliation, he asserted that she did not disclose her HIV-positive status before they 
engaged in unprotected sexual relations, although the woman testified that they had used 
condoms since their relationship commenced. “In a bitter irony, he was given an absolute 
discharge with no criminal record despite being found guilty of assaulting her and her son.” 
Alison Symington, Criminalization Confusion and Concerns: The Decade Since the 
Cuerrier Decision, 14 HIV/AIDS POL’Y & L. REV. 4, 9 (2009); see also BOURNE ET AL., 
supra note 44, at 12 (finding that some HIV-positive individuals were fearful of 
“retribution from disgruntled ex-partners”). 
127 See Fan, supra note 23, at 574–75 (discussing the problems with proving consent 
at trial). 
128 Id. at 574. 
129 See supra Part III.A.1. 
130 Dan Subotnik, Copulemus in Pace: A Meditation on Rape, Affirmative Consent to 
Sex, and Sexual Autonomy, 41 AKRON L. REV. 847, 857–59 (2008). It is worth noting that a 
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individual engages in sexual intercourse “would impose an excessive degree of 
formality and artificiality on a dimension of life in which spontaneity is 
important.”131  
If consent is not negotiated verbally, then it will be negotiated based on 
contextual cues and understandings about human behavior. However, these 
indicators are imperfect sources of information. Thus, there is a strong probability, 
especially when Internet dating is concerned, that an HIV-positive individual will 
hold a mistaken, but good-faith, belief that his or her partner consented. As 
demonstrated above, community norms exist within the HIV Internet dating 
community. Consequently, there are outsiders unaware of these conventions, and 
HIV-positive individuals may mistakenly rely on these norms to their detriment. 
In their current form, the transmission statutes do not distinguish between 
those who intend harm from those who hold a good-faith belief that a partner 
consented. The statutes also fail to proportionately assign punishment to those who 
were reckless or negligent with regard to their partner’s consent.132 Accordingly, 
the possibility for disproportionate punishment results.133 The laws need to be 
restructured in a way that allocates punishment based on the degree of 
blameworthiness inherent in the conduct itself. Professor Margo Kaplan recently 
proposed a sample statute134 that would afford punishment according to a 
defendant’s degree of blameworthiness relative to her partner’s consent. Kaplan’s 
sample statute reads as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
verbal mandate would not resolve issues relating to conflicting evidence—the “he-said, 
she-said” problem—that may arise in criminal prosecutions under HIV-exposure statutes.  
131 Wertheimer, supra note 39, at 574. 
132 Kaplan, supra note 8, at 1532–34. 
133 All states with HIV-exposure statutes categorize the offense as a felony with the 
exception of Maryland and North Carolina. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN § 18-601.1(b) 
(LexisNexis 2009); 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 41A.0202 (2011).  
134 Professor Kaplan proposes three changes to the transmission statutes. See 
generally Kaplan, supra note 8. First, she suggests the statutes should punish in terms of 
risk creation. This requires juries to consider all the factors that influence the risk to which 
the defendant exposed the victim, such as viral load and condom use. Second, she proposes 
that the prosecution demonstrate the defendant had a culpable mental state as to 
transmission. Third, she suggests “a more nuanced approach to consent that focuses on 
consent to degrees of risk.” Id. at 1522. 
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It is unlawful for an individual 
(1) [with the purpose of infecting another with HIV] 
(2) [who is aware of and ignores a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that her actions will result in HIV infection of another] 
(3) [who should have been aware of a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that her actions will result in HIV infection of another] 
to engage in conduct that creates a substantial and unjustifiable risk of 
infecting another with HIV. For the purposes of this statute, the word 
“creates” applies only to the degree of risk that the defendant 
[knows/recklessly disregards a risk/should have known] the victim did 
not consent to.135 
 
1.  Defects Cured 
 
Kaplan’s statute resolves several issues discussed in this Note. First, the 
model statute assigns punishment in relation to the defendant’s degree of moral 
blameworthiness. For example, an HIV-positive defendant who knows his or her 
partner did not consent to HIV exposure may be distinguished from the defendant 
who should have been aware his or her partner did not consent. The defendant 
who, albeit negligently or recklessly, is mistaken about his partner’s consent may 
be punished proportionately.136 Statutory construction in this manner avoids the 
risk of disproportionate punishment. Consider, for example, scenario one where 
Bob posted his HIV-positive status on his online dating profile but failed to 
verbally disclose his status to his partner. Here, the jury may choose to convict Bob 
of a lesser offense based on a negligence standard—even though he believed in 
good faith that his partner knew his serostatus, he should have been aware of the 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that his partner did not consent to exposure.  
Second, the statute removes all of the disclosure language. Disclosure alone 
does not ensure that an exposed partner consciously appreciated the risks of 
exposure. Punishment is centered on the defendant’s level of awareness in relation 
to what his or her partner consented. Awareness of partner consent need not result 
from verbal exchange alone, and Kaplan’s statute permits partners to negotiate 
consent contextually.137  
 
 
 
135 Kaplan, supra note 8, at 1551. 
136 Still, as noted by the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, “because of 
prejudices against people living with HIV—including those from marginalized and 
stigmatized populations”—applying standards of recklessness and negligence could be 
problematic because juries, courts, and prosecutors may find that “any sexual acts” by 
HIV-positive people meet these standards of culpability. UNAIDS GUIDANCE NOTE, supra 
note 50, at 23. 
137 See Kaplan, supra note 8, at 1550–51 (discussing current statutes’ failure to 
consider social cues as a form of consent). 
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2.  Remaining Flaws 
 
While Kaplan’s statute cures some of the defects surrounding the consent and 
disclosure provisions, problems still remain. Namely, “what is unreasonable 
behavior or unusual risk in one setting or sub-population may not be in another. A 
jury of sexually active gay men might see a case differently than a jury of straight 
married people.”138 Individuals vary with respect to how they perceive risk. First, 
people regard purely voluntary risks as less threatening.139 Two people who meet 
on an adult dating website and engage in casual sex may regard the risks of their 
behavior differently than a juror who would never voluntarily do the same.  
Second, when sexual activity is concerned, the degree of risk a person 
identifies will vary depending on the information presented to him or her and his or 
her understanding of the nature of the relationship involved.140 For example, the 
HIV-positive individual who is familiar with and informed about the “Code of the 
Condom”141 might find the risk of nonconsent lower than the juror who is 
unfamiliar with this community norm. Also, an understanding of the complexities 
that are embedded in the relationship at issue influences risk perception. 
Heightened risk perception may result from the conservative juror’s inability to 
understand the complexities of online relationships and community norms. 
Because the conservative juror does not understand the nature of these casual, 
online sexual relationships, she finds the risk of partner nonconsent greater. Lastly, 
studies demonstrate gender differences in risk perception.142 Women identify risks 
as greater and are less willing to tolerate them than men.143  
Therefore, when relying on a juror’s determination of what the defendant 
knew, what risks he or she consciously disregarded, and what risks he or she 
should have been aware of, how may we bridge the disparity between a defendant 
and a juror’s risk evaluation of nonconsent? There are no definitive answers, but 
providing the juror with more information is a good starting point. Information can 
138 Burris et al., supra note 7, at 509. 
139 David Aldous, Risk to Individuals: Perception and Reality, in ON CHANCE AND 
UNPREDICTABILITY: 13/20 LECTURES ON THE LINKS BETWEEN MATHEMATICAL 
PROBABILITY AND THE REAL WORLD 53, 56 (2012), available at http://www.stat.berkeley.e 
du/~aldous/Real-World/draft_book.pdf. 
140 Kaplan, supra note 8, at 1550–51; see also BOURNE ET AL., supra note 44, at 7 
(indicating that “[a]fter diagnosis, men’s risk perceptions continue to undergo significant 
changes, influenced by their own emotional state, experience, and information gained as 
they [made] decisions about being sexually active individuals with HIV”). 
141 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
142 Nancy Levit, Confronting Conventional Thinking: The Heuristics Problem in 
Feminist Legal Theory, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 391, 424 (2006); see also Paul Slovic, Trust, 
Emotion, Sex, Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk Assessment Battlefield, 1997 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 59, 68 (“Several dozen studies have documented the finding that men tend 
to judge risks as smaller and less problematic than do women.”). 
143 Levit, supra note 142, at 424. 
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alter judgments about risk.144 Because familiarity with community conventions 
guide individual risk evaluation, it is important to educate the jury on these 
community norms. 
As exemplified in the above scenarios, the online dating community maintains 
its own norms and language that are unlikely to be understood by a community of 
traditional jurors.145 Information about how online community conventions 
influence assumptions about partner consent may help bridge the defendant/juror 
risk-evaluation gap. Educating the jury about these norms may encourage them to 
assign punishment proportionate to a defendant’s blameworthiness. Jury 
instructions may be an effective means by which to provide this information. As 
the United States Supreme Court has said, “[t]he adversary system, with lay jurors 
as the usual ultimate factfinders in criminal prosecutions, has historically permitted 
triers of fact to draw on the standards of their community, guided always by 
limiting instructions on the law.”146 
 
3.  Model Jury Instruction 
 
In light of the considerations above, this Note proposes the following model 
jury instruction: 
 
The prosecution is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant [knew/recklessly disregarded/should have known] [name] 
did not consent to the risk of HIV infection. When considering whether 
the defendant [knew/recklessly disregarded/should have known] [name] 
did not consent to the risk of HIV infection, you are to consider the 
totality of the circumstances bearing on the defendant’s degree of 
awareness that [name] did not consent to the risk of infection. Consent 
need not be verbal in all cases. Consent can only occur nonverbally when 
a reliable context otherwise establishes the victim’s consent to the risk of 
HIV infection. 
Lastly, you are instructed to consider that defendant and [name] met 
on an Internet dating website. Like any community, Internet dating 
communities have their own unique norms and language you may be 
unfamiliar with. You are to consider these factors in determining whether 
the prosecution has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
144 See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Hazard Communication: 
Warnings and Risk, 545 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 106, 106–07 (1996). 
145 “Values in these communities are often formed, reflected and transmitted not only 
through traditional institutions of moral influence but also popular culture and social 
media. . . . [W]e are [not] . . . members of a single, unified and consciously accepted group 
engaged in the common pursuit of our own forms of sexual satisfaction.” Scott Burris & 
Matthew Weait, Criminalisation and Moral Responsibility for Sexual Transmission of HIV 
5 (Temple U. Beasley Sch. of L. Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2013-
17, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2126714. 
146 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1973). 
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[knew/recklessly disregarded/should have known] [name] did not 
consent to the risk of HIV. If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that defendant [knew/recklessly disregarded/should have known] 
[name] did not consent to the risk of HIV infection, you must find 
defendant not guilty. 
 
The bracketed areas represent the different mental states required147 by the 
offense charged. Defense counsel should also be encouraged to request the court to 
instruct the jury on lesser included offenses and mistake of fact when applicable. 
The instruction is designed to encourage a thoughtful consideration of the various 
factors that contributed to the defendant’s determination that his or her partner 
consented. It serves briefly to inform jurors about how online daters move within 
their own community. Knowledge on this matter reminds the jury to consider the 
factors that bear on how an HIV-positive e-dater may evaluate the risk of 
nonconsent differently, thereby reducing the risk that a defendant will receive 
disproportionate punishment.  
Furthermore, it reminds jurors that consent to the risk of HIV infection need 
not be verbal. It is the jury’s fact-finding duty to determine if consent to exposure 
was in fact communicated contextually. Where it may not be apparent to the jury 
that certain situations establish consent by themselves, including this provision in 
the instruction serves to remind jurors that acquittal may be warranted when the 
exposed party consents—albeit nonverbally—to the risk of HIV infection. As a 
result, it decreases the risk that constitutionally protected private, consensual 
sexual conduct will become subject to punishment.  
As an example, consider again our characters from scenario one, Bob and 
Angela. First, the instruction reminds the jury that Angela’s consent to the risk of 
HIV exposure could occur nonverbally. However, the jury must first look at the 
circumstances, including Bob’s online dating profile that revealed his serostatus, 
and determine whether the context met a level of reliability that could establish 
Angela’s consent and replace the need for verbal communication. Moreover, by 
requesting that the jury consider Internet dating norms, the instruction asks the jury 
to examine evidence that might otherwise be dismissed, such as online serosorting 
practices. The instruction encourages jurors to examine Bob’s culpability in view 
of these norms and to look beyond their own predilections concerning risk and 
morality. When a defendant, like Bob, faces charges under an HIV-exposure law 
based on sexual conduct with a partner met online, Kaplan’s narrowly tailored 
statute, coupled with the model instruction above, minimizes the danger of 
disproportionate punishment. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
The law of consent is a legal anomaly. It focuses not only on the defendant’s 
state of mind, but also on the victim’s mindset. Or, rather, what the defendant 
147 Kaplan, supra note 8, at 1551. 
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knew about the victim’s mindset. Consent to HIV exposure is consent to a risk, not 
consent to an act. Consent to an act is more outwardly apparent—signals of 
nonconsent may include physical resistance, incapacity, signs of emotional 
oppression, among others. Consent to a risk, however, is purely subjective. 
Accordingly, there is more room for good-faith mistakes vis-à-vis partner consent. 
The risk is only exacerbated by the many nonverbal ways in which individuals 
negotiate consent and disclosure in the context of sexual relations. Moreover, 
assumptions about online dating community norms create an additional layer of 
opportunity for good-faith mistakes. The statutes do not accommodate the potential 
for mistakes as they fail to provide for the varying degrees of culpability held by a 
defendant relative to his or her partner’s consent 
The ambiguously drafted HIV-exposure statutes offer no guidance on what 
constitutes legally permissible consent and disclosure; courts have yet to require a 
verbal mandate nor have they determined whether consent and disclosure may be 
inferred from the circumstances. Accordingly, criminal-transmission laws may 
touch private, consensual sexual relations—a privacy right protected by the 
Constitution. This lack of clarity is particularly problematic in the Internet age 
where online dating sites facilitate nonverbal negotiation of disclosure and consent. 
With the growing popularity of online dating between HIV-positive 
and -negative individuals alike, a greater necessity arises for these ambiguous 
statutes to be restructured. Kaplan’s proposed statute rectifies several problems 
with these disclosure and consent provisions. However, this statute fails to bridge 
the gap that exists between the lay juror’s risk perception and the HIV-positive e-
dater’s risk perception of partner nonconsent. This gap may be bridged by 
informing jurors about e-dating community norms under which the HIV-positive 
defendant maneuvers. The instruction is designed to encourage a thoughtful 
consideration of the online community norms that may contribute to the 
defendant’s determination that his partner consented. 
In their current state, the disclosure and consent exceptions are flawed. 
Regulating behavior as complicated as consensual sexual relations requires careful 
statutory construction—especially when technology adds an additional layer of 
complexity. The criminal-transmission statutes’ disclosure and consent exceptions 
need restructuring to account for these complexities. Structural changes to the 
statutory scheme can help rectify these flaws and ensure that only the truly 
culpable are convicted. Nearly two decades have passed since these statutes were 
first enacted. Since that time, the Internet has dramatically transformed our 
behaviors and the ways in which we relate to one another. The HIV-exposure 
statutes must be overhauled in light of these changes. 
